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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JACK NEIL COLONNA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 870136 
Pr Lority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
The Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts are set 
forth in Appellant's Brief at 1-9. Mr. Colonna takes this 
opportunity to reply to portions of Point II and III of Respondent's 
Brief. Issues to which Mr. Colonna does not reply are adequately 
covered in Appellant's Opening Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The due process argument should be reviewed on appeal since 
the outrageous conduct of the officer coupled with the ineffective 
assistance of counsel makes this an exceptional circumstance where 
the issue should be reviewed even though it was not raised in the 
trial court. The record establishes that the conduct of Mr. Colonna 
was relatively passive and that the officer's conduct offended 
traditional notions of fairness. 
Mr. Colonna was prejudiced by the deficient performance of 
trial counsel in failing to raise the due process issue at trial. 
The State is arguing that this Court should not review the issue 
based on counsel's deficient performance in failing to raise it; if 
reviewed, the case should be dismissed as a result of the violation. 
Mr. Colonna was also prejudiced by Officer Droubay's 
testimony regarding Mr. Colonna's past offenses, misconduct 
involving violence and reputation. Given the relatively passive 
role of Mr. Colonna and the taint of such information, Mr. Colonna 
was prejudiced by counsel's failure to object or otherwise limit the 
testimony. 
POINT I. 
THE OFFICER'S OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT AMOUNTED 
TO A DUE PROCESS VIOLATION. 
(Reply to Point II) 
While State v. Stegell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983) 
points out that except in exceptional circumstances, an appellate 
court will not review an issue raised for the first time on appeal, 
this Court should nevertheless review this issue since the due 
process violation rendered the result so "fundamentally unfair11 in 
the instant case so as to constitute one of those "exceptional 
circumstances" requiring review even though the matter was not 
raised in the trial court. See generally Rose v. Clark, 478 
U.S. , 106 S.Ct. , 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 470 (1986); Delaware v. 
Van Arsdall, 476 U.S. , 106 S.Ct. , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). 
The substantial unfairness of allowing this conviction to stand 
where the officer instigated the robbery and played a more active 
role in it than Mr. Colonna coupled with the ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel in failing to raise the issue, makes this an 
exceptional circumstance requiring review. 
When reviewing the substance of the due process argument, 
this Court should not be persuaded by the state's assertion that 
Droubay's conduct was not so outrageous as to constitute a due 
process violation (Resp. Br. at 17) and its implication that Mr. 
Colonna played a "significant independent" role in the incident 
(Resp. Br. at 16-17). Neither assertion is supported by any 
citations to the record. 
On the contrary, the record indicates that Mr. Colonna 
played a relatively minor role in the incident and that Droubay's 
conduct was outrageous enough to constitute a due process 
violation. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 26-34. Mr. Britton 
indicated that Mr. Colonna was "mostly just hollering" (T. 102) and 
that Colonna kept Officer Droubay from taking a gun that had 
sentimental value to Mr. Britton (T. 99) and Mr. Britton's black 
leather jacket (T. 105). Droubay himself acknowledged that Colonna 
kept him from taking a manifold 1 (T. 65). Mr. Britton testified 
that the officer took his wallet and took his money out (T. 106). 
Droubay acknowledged taking the wallet but claimed East took the 
money out (T. 71-2). Mr. Britton was most frightened by Droubay and 
1
 Droubay testified that he saw the manifold on the floor, picked it 
up and asked Colonna, "[i]s this your manifold?" (T. 65). Colonna 
responded negatively. The implication in such testimony is that 
Droubay wanted to take the manifold. 
testified that Droubay grabbed Britten's fingers and threatened to 
cut another one off 2 (T. 106). 
Under the circumstances of this case, the conduct of the 
officer was so outrageous as to "'shock [ ] . . • the universal 
sense of justice1 mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment." United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1971). 
POINT II. 
MR. COLONNAfS CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED 
AS A RESULT OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
(Reply to Respondent's Point III) 
In Point II of its brief at 14-15, the State argues that 
this Court should not review the due process argument raised on 
appeal ff[b]ecause this issue is raised for the first time on 
appeal". Should this Court agree and refuse to review this issue 
despite the evidence of police over involvement in a violent crime, 
the deficient performance of counsel in failing to raise the issue 
at trial would preclude Mr. Colonna from having this issue, which is 
an integral aspect of the crime, considered. Given the facts in 
this case and the serious misconduct of the officer, there is a 
"reasonable likelihood of a different result" if this issue were 
reviewed since the finding of a due process violation would result 
in dismissal (See Appellant's Opening Brief at 22-32). Hence, 
Mr. Colonna is prejudiced by counsel's failure to raise the due 
process issue at trial. 
2
 Droubay acknowledged the finger incident but claimed that he did 
not threaten to cut one off (T. 96). Droubay was the only person 
with gloves on, which further frightened Mr. Britton and suggested a 
concern for leaving fingerprints on Droubay's part (T. 74, 188, 198), 
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The State also claims that Mr. Colonna was not prejudiced 
by references to past offenses (Respondent's Brief at 21). The 
State attempts to minimize the impact of the information by calling 
them "passing references". While the State is free to describe any 
testimony as a "passing reference", each such "passing reference", 
is nevertheless a piece of evidence heard and retained by the jury 
and considered as part of the jury's decision. The "passing 
references" in this case were direct responses to the prosecutor's 
questions and referred to prior crimes, incidents involving 
violence, incidents involving disrespect for police officers and a 
reference to Mr. Colonna's background and character which implied 
that he is a well known bad actor. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 
38-44. By the time the fourth such "passing reference" reached the 
jury, unless the jurors were asleep, they had heard and retained 
evidence that Mr. Colonna was a bad and violent person. 
The state claims that the "substantial evidence" of 
Mr. Colonna's guilt negates the prejudice prong without specifically 
outlining that evidence. Of the three participants in this crime, 
Mr. Colonna was the most passive, regardless of whose testimony is 
cited. Droubay himself acknowledged that he believed Mr. Colonna 
was just talking big and that the drugs were talking. Mr. Britton 
testified that Mr. Colonna did not do "a whole lot. He was mostly 
just hollering" (R. 193). Substantial evidence of Mr. Colonna's 
guilt does not exist in this case; nor does substantial evidence 
that Mr. Colonna would have committed the crime had Droubay not 
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supplied him with drugs and alcohol, taken him to Britton's house 
and participated and egged him on. Had the jury not been given 
information that suggested Jack to be a violent and dangerous man, 
there is a "reasonable likelihood of a different result," 
Furthermore, as Justice Zimmerman pointed out in his 
concurring opinion in State v. Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 47 
(February 3, 1988): 
This Court's decisions have consistently recognized 
that an accused is almost certainly prejudiced 
unfairly when evidence of unrelated crimes or bad acts 
is introduced because of "the tendency of a fact 
finder to convict the accused because of bad character 
rather than because he [or she] is shown to be guilty 
of the offenses charged." [citations omitted] 
Given the relatively passive role played by Mr. Colonna in 
this crime and the acknowledged prejudicial effect of unrelated 
crimes or bad acts, the statements in this case prejudiced 
Mr. Colonna. 
CONCLUSION 
For any of the foregoing reasons, Appellant seeks reversal 
of his conviction and remand of his case to the District Court for 
dismissal of the charges or in the alternative a new trial. 
Q 
DATED this / day of May, 1988. 
/ S • i 1 1 
GEORGE WADDOUPS 
Attorney for Appellant 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that ten copies of the 
foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant have been forwarded to the 
Supreme Court, State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, and four 
copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 84114, this jf) day of May, 1988. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED by this day of 
May, 1988. 
